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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly demanded in civil, military and
research purposes. However, they also possess serious threats to the society because
faults in UAVs can lead to physical damage or even loss of life. While increasing their
intelligence, for example, adding vision-based sense-and-avoid capability, has a poten-
tial to reduce the safety threats, increased software complexity and the need for higher
computing performance create additional challenges software bugs and transient hard-
ware faults that must be addressed to realize intelligent and safe UAV systems.
In this thesis, we present a fault tolerant system design for UAVs. Our proposal is
to use two heterogeneous hardware and software platforms with distinct reliability
and performance characteristics: High-Assurance (HA) and High-Performance (HP)
platforms. The HA platform focuses on simplicity and verifiability in software and
uses a simple and transient fault tolerant processor, while the HP platform focuses on
intelligence and functionality in software and uses a complex and high performance
processor. During the normal operation, the HP platform is responsible for controlling
the UAV. However, if it fails due to transient hardware faults or software bugs, the HA
platform will take over until the HP platform recovers.
We have implemented the proposed design on an actual UAV using a low-cost Arduino
and a high-performance Tegra TK1 multi core platform. Our case-studies show that
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The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is rapidly increasing in recent years due to diverse
recreational, commercial, and military applications. Modern UAVs have begun incorporating a
range of new technology, including electronic sensors that stabilise them. Some models can even
be programmed to fly set paths or patterns. Another good example is a UAV with a small camera
attached to it that gives the birds-eye view of the surroundings.
These advancements have not only seen UAVs becoming popular amongst even the most casual
of hobbyists, but also in commercial endeavours. Large companies such as Facebook, Google and
Amazon have already invested heavily in research related to drones, and even smaller companies
such as florists, pizza restaurants (and even real-estate agencies) have started to investigate how
drones can be used in their industry. More recently news agencies have begun to look at using
drones when covering certain news stories, and Hollywood has already started using drones during
the production of movies and TV shows.
Most of the UAVs work in close proximity with the humans and the physical environment.
Hence, there is an increasing demand for intelligent UAV systems that are cognizant of the sur-
rounding environment and perform sophisticated tasks including collision avoidance.
An intelligent UAV system requires integration of advanced sensor packages (e.g. vision) and
high computational performance to process the enormous amount of real-time sensor data and to
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execute complex algorithms in a timely manner. The rapidly increasing computing capacity of
modern embedded computing platforms multiple CPU cores, GPU, and other accelerators makes
it feasible to develop such a UAV system while satisfying size, weight, and power (SWaP) require-
ments of UAVs. In order to get the full benefits of this powerful hardware, a powerful software
frame work like CUDA for GPU applications, opencv for vision based application and so on is
required. The combination of powerful hardware together with the powerful software makes the
computing platform in the UAV to look almost like a desktop computer.
1.1 Motivation
The push for higher intelligence in UAV systems also creates serious side effects in terms of safety
and reliability. First, the complexity of software systems is rapidly increasing, which makes it
difficult to weed out software bugs. For example, an intelligent flight control system with vision
based collision avoidance capability, which in itself can be complex and difficult to verify, may
also depend on complex middleware packages (e.g., Robot Operating System, ROS [32]) and the
OS (e.g., Linux), each of which may be comprised of multi-million lines of code.
Second, to achieve high intelligence, the use of high performance computing platforms is nec-
essary. However, high performance computing platforms are increasingly prone to transient hard-
ware faults (soft errors) due to environmental effects such as single-event upsets (SEUs) [15].
SEUs are caused by high energy particle strikes from cosmic rays [39] which result in bit flips.
The technology treads to develop efficient and high-performance processors shrinking dimensions
and operating voltage, and increased frequency and density have dramatically increased the possi-
bilities of SEUs [15], which could result in unexpected failures in the system [23, 36]
There has been a large body of research in the control systems community regarding the design
of fault tolerant control of UAV systems [34]. While these fault tolerant controllers are designed
to handle structural damage, actuator and sensor failures, they typically do not handle system-level
failure such as on-board computing platform malfunction, which prevents execution of the control
algorithms in the first place. System-level reliability can be generally improved by redundancy. A
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well-known technique is triple modular redundancy (TMR) [26] in which three identical systems
produce control outputs in order to survive from failures of any one of the system. However, the
size, weight, and power considerations as well as the cost make the TMR solution undesirable,
especially in small UAVs.
1.2 Contribution
To address the safety and reliability challenges of UAV systems, we present a UAV system design
and implementation based on Simplex architecture [35]. The main idea of the Simplex architec-
ture is that a simple verifiable controller provides safety of the system, while a complex, high-
performance controller strives to achieve high system performance. The choice between the two
controllers is determined by a decision module, which constantly assesses the safety status of the
system and makes the decision.
Our contribution is a novel application of the Simplex architecture to develop both intelligent
and reliable UAV systems in a cost effective manner. Specifically, we realize the Simplex ar-
chitecture using two heterogeneous hardware platforms with distinct reliability and performance
characteristics. The idea is that we use a reliable but less performance hardware platform, which
we call a High-Assurance (HA) platform, to be responsible for safety while we use a more per-
formance, but potentially less reliable platform, which we call a High-Performance (HP) platform,
for performance and intelligence of the UAV. Only the HA platform both software and hardware
forms the trusted computing base (TCB) of the UAV. The HP platform, on the other hand, can be
affected by software bugs and SEUs, which could result in failures (e.g., crashes), but the whole
system safety will still be insured by the safety platform.
1.3 Implementation
We applied the proposed design in implementing a custom fixed-wing UAV system, shown in
Figure 1.1, using a low-cost Arduino as our HA platform and a Tegra TK1 as HP platform. We
3
Figure 1.1: DG 808S with our custom built avionics
demonstrate the ability to recover from crashes through a set of fault-injection experiments in a
hardware-in-the-loop simulation setup. The results suggest that the proposed design can substan-
tially increase safety of intelligent UAVs.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses various fault types in a UAV
and related background. Chapter 3 presents the proposed UAV simplex architecture. Chapter 4
describes our implementation of a fixed-wing UAV based on the proposed architecture. Chapter 5
presents our evaluation results and we conclude in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this section, we discuss various types of faults that can occur in a UAV and safety conditions
that should be followed by the aircraft in order to be safe and reliable. We then discuss related
work.
2.1 Faults
An UAV is a cyber-physical system, which includes cyber part (computing hardware and software)
and physical part (sensors, actuators, UAV frame, and etc).
Faults in physical components of an UAV and their handling has been well studied in the
control and aerospace communities. For example, structural damage or bias in sensor readings
can be tolerated by advanced adaptive control algorithms that take such effects into account. A
comprehensive review on the topic can be found in [34]. However, advanced control algorithms
must be realized in software binaries running on computing platforms i.e., the cyber system.
Faults in the cyber system can arise from a number of different reasons. The most common type
of faults are logical faults in software i.e., software bugs. As the demand for higher intelligence
and functionality increase, the size and complexity of flight control software keeps increasing [20].
While model-based design and verification methodologies have made great progress [21, 20, 16],
it is still difficult to completely weed out all bugs.
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Another type of faults are temporal faults, which occur when the real-time requirements (i.e.,
deadlines) of various tasks in the system are not met. Temporal correctness is difficult to guarantee
especially in multi core architecture because of uncontrolled sharing of many performance critical
hardware resources such as cache and DRAM among concurrently executing tasks can cause highly
variable timing [25, 30].
Third, often overlooked but increasingly important type of faults are transient hardware faults
due to single event upsets (SEUs). SEUs are caused by cosmic radiation and alpha particles [39, 27]
resulting bit flips. Because SEUs can occur anywhere in SRAM, registers, and combinational
logic, it can cause, for example, an invalid instruction exception, a parity error, a memory access
violation, a wrong conditional branch, and ultimately a system crash [36]. As technology scaling
continues (i.e., more transistors in a chip), sensitivity to radiation has dramatically increased [15].
Traditional circuit-level solutions—special circuit design and manufacturing process—are not only
expensive but also often lag several generations behind the state-of-the-art processors [18]. This
is a serious impediment to develop intelligent UAVs that require cutting edge high performance
computing capabilities.
2.2 Safety Conditions
In a UAV, the controller program acts in conjunction with the physical dynamics of the system.
Based on the dynamics, the system has safety conditions that needs to be respected to maintain
the safety of the UAV. Aircraft stall is one example for the safety condition [2]. When an aircraft
flies at a certain altitude, it makes an angle called angle of attack with the wind. If the autonomous
controller gives output such that the aircraft starts to climb then this angle of attack increases.
Once the angle of attack crosses the threshold value (varies from one aircraft to another and it
is determined using the aircraft’s dynamics), the wings of the aircraft will not be able to lift the
aircraft.
Another safety condition that needs to be respected by the UAV system is the regulations. The
UAVs operate at close proximity with humans and physical environment. The government makes
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the regulations that must be followed by commercial UAVs. One such regulation is the limit on
the altitude that commercial UAVs should fly. In United States the commercial UAVs are allowed
to fly less than 400 feet from ground level [3].
In summary, as the demand for higher intelligence in UAVs increases, the importance of re-
liable computing software and hardware platform the cyber system increases. However, the in-
creased software complexity and the use of high performance multi core processors, while neces-
sary, would increase all three types of faults logical, temporal, and transient hardware faults of the
cyber system of an UAV. The UAV systems face safety threats not only from these faults but also
from the autonomous controller that is not obeying the physical constraints.
2.3 Related Work
Software reliability have long been a major concern in safety-critical cyber-physical systems. For
example, software in commercial airplanes must follow certain standards (e.g., DO-178C [33] and
ARINC-653 [13]) and be certified by certification authorities. At the application-level, model-
based designs and formal-methods [20, 16, 21] have made significant advance, it is still difficult
to verify the correctness of the software at the code-level [28]. Furthermore, the applications also
rely on many other system software components, including the OS and middleware, each of which
may contain bugs.
System-level reliability and fault-tolerance techniques, especially in the context of intelligent
cyber-physical systems, have been studied to mitigate possible software bugs. SAFER is a middle-
ware framework that uses software-level redundancy to enhance system-level reliability. However,
such a middleware solution may not survive from an OS failure (e.g., BSOD). The seL4 is a micro-
kernel where its functional correctness was formally verified [24]. However, functional correctness
does not means its temporal correctness is guaranteed. Nor it guarantees correct operations in the
presence of transient hardware faults (SEUs), which are becoming more prevalent as technology
scaling continues [18]. C’Mon focuses on detecting OS-level timing faults (e.g., deadline misses
due to scheduling) that are caused by SEUs [36]. To guard the OS code and data against SEUs,
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dOSEK proposed to use a special encoding in storing OS code and data, which enables detection
and recovery from the SEUs [23]. However, its software-based approach comes at a significant
performance penalty.
SEUs can be reduced at each hardware component-level by, for example, adopting ECC and
other so called “hardening” techniques [15]. Also, hardware redundancy solutions, such as Triple-
modular redundancy (TMR) [26] or dual-redundancy, can protect the system from transient hard-
ware faults [15]. In today’s commercial airplanes and satellites, the physical redundancy based
techniques are used due to their high safety-critical requirements [19]. However, these hardware
techniques comes at substantial space and performance penalties and high cost and development
time—unsuitable for UAVs. Also, the processors used in these applications often several genera-
tions behind the stat-of-the-art COTS processors [25, 17]. This is a serious problem for intelligent
UAVs where high computing performance is a key to achieve high intelligence.
The simplex architecture [35] is a special form of redundancy in which safety and performance
are decoupled to safety and performance controllers, respectively. It was originally implemented
at the application software-level in a single computing platform and used to upgrade/verify con-
trollers without stopping the system [35]. More recently, Bak et al. implemented the safety-critical
parts of the system—safety controller and decision logic—in FPGA so that it can tolerate system-
level faults in the computer system running the performance controller for an inverted pendulum
and a cardiac pacemaker [14]. [10] is an extension of simplex architecture and Abdi et al showed
that a software fault in cyber-physical system can be recovered by restarting the system at run-
time. In [12], Abdi et al proposed a novel approach to design a controller that enables the system
to restart and remain safe during and after the restart. Their approach is also based on simplex
architecture and it requires only one processing unit. Hence, [12] is almost similar to the original
simplex architecture, but it also provides recovery from system level faults. Another version of
simplex is shown in [38] and it is used to detect intrusion in cyber-physical systems. Abdi et al
in [11] proposed a version of simplex architecture that adds security to the cyber-pyhsical systems
by adding a monitoring module(checks for any intrusion) inside complex system. If monitoring
8




In this chapter, we review the Simplex architecture [35] and describe our two heterogeneous plat-
forms based approach.
The Simplex architecture is composed of three components: a safety controller, a performance
controller, and a decision logic [35]. Normally, the performance controller drives the plant (in our
case, the UAV) as it offers higher control performance. However, if the safety conditions of the
plant are to be violated, as determined by the decision logic, the safety controller will assume the
control of the plant until the performance controller is recovered (for example, by restarting it). In
this way, faults in the performance controller does not cause safety failure of the system.
In the original Simplex applications, however, all three components share the same computing
hardware (processor) and software platform (OS, middleware) [35]. This means that system-level
faults in the shared hardware and software platform—SEUs in the processor, bugs in the OS and
middleware—could still compromise the safety of the system. as shown in Table 3.1. To overcome
the limitations, we propose to realize the Simplex architecture by using two platforms with distinct
reliability and performance characteristics, as shown in Table 3.1. The High-Assurance (HA)
platform focuses on safety and verifiability over performance and functionality. For hardware, we
assume that it uses chips that are more tolerant to SEUs. While a number of techniques can be
used to reduce the SEU rate of a chip—ECC, manufacturing process, and etc.—using simple, low-
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Table 3.1: Platform characteristics
Platform High-Assurance (HA) High-Performance (HP)
Hardware SEU resistant SEU susceptible
Software Verifiable Unverifiable
density chips running at low operating frequency could also help reduce the overall SEU rate [15].
For software, we assume that the platform uses a small RTOS with proven (verified) reliability. For
example, the seL4 micro-kernel’s functional correctness was formally verified [24]. Also, there are
many other commercial/open-source RTOSs that have been used in critical applications.
On the other hand, the High-Performance (HP) platform focuses on performance and function-
ality over safety. For hardware, it may use a complex, high-performance (multicore) processor,
which runs at multi-gigahertz frequencies and is composed of multi-billion transistors. Generally,
such a processor suffers more SEUs than a simpler, low-performance one because higher density
and operating frequency negatively affect SEUs [15]. For software, it may use a rich OS (e.g.,
Linux) and middleware solutions (e.g., Robot Operating System: ROS) to offer sophisticated ca-
pabilities needed to implement high intelligence. However, each of the software package may be
comprised of many million lines of code, which makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to verify
its correctness.
Among the three components in the Simplex architecture, we assign the safety controller and
the decision logic on the HA platform, while assign the performance controller on the HP platform.
The performance controller may implement an advanced control algorithm and intelligent sens-
ing capabilities, such as vision-based collision avoidance, that require high computing performance
and rich OS and middleware support. The HP platform offers such computing power and func-
tionality but it does not guarantee safety and reliability. On the other hand, the safety controller
implements a simple and proven control algorithm that is always ready to take over the perfor-
mance controller, if necessary, as determined by the decision logic. In our design, as in the original
Simplex architecture, correct functioning of the safety controller and the decision logic is required.
In addition, the HA platform provid es a safe and reliable execution environment although it may
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Table 3.2: Fault detection
Observed behaviors Faults in the HP platform
No output OS/controller crash
Delayed output Deadline miss
Unsafe output Bugs, SEUs, bad controller design, etc.
not provide high computing performance or rich middleware support.
3.1 Fault Model
We assume that faults can occur only in the HP platform. In other words, we trust the correct func-
tioning of the HA platform the safety controller and decision logic. To ensure this, hardware of the
HA platform must be resistant to transient hardware faults, and the complexity of its software must
be limited to a level that can be rigorously tested and possibly verified. On the other hand, we do
not trust both hardware and software of the HP platform—i.e., the OS can crash, the performance
controller may crash or produce invalid outputs (e.g., NaN output) or simply miss the deadline due
to resource contention. Also, the HP platform can suffer transient hardware faults (SEUs) which
lead to system crash or application failure.
Lastly, in this work, we do not consider physical faults, such as structural damage, bias in
sensor readings, sensor and actuator malfunction, and so on. We assume that these physical issues
are tolerated by adaptive control algorithms, which have been extensively studied in the aerospace
engineering community [34].
3.2 Safety Region
Physical systems, especially UAVs, have limits and constraints that need to be respected. For
example, a UAV should have angle of attack less than critical angle of attack [2] to avoid stall
condition. Safety region S is a subset of State Space Model SSM where all this constraints are
respected.
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SSM = Ax+Bu (3.1)
S⊆ SSM (3.2)
Where x denotes the states of the system and u represents the inputs to the system. A and
B matrices are the dynamics of the system. The safety region can be defined by the following
equation.
S = {x|Sx · x≤ 1} (3.3)
Equation 3.3 conveys that for every state x in the system state space model SSM there exists a
safety matrix Sx such that dot product of safety matrix and their corresponding state should be less
than or equal to one. If the system state is outside this safety region then the system is said to be
unsafe.
Safety region also considers the limits on the actuators. The actuators have their range for
operation. Hence this range should also be considered while defining the safety region. The safety
region that defines this operating range for the actuators are formulated as follows.
Su = {u|Su ·u≤ 1} (3.4)
Equation 3.4 conveys that, for every actuator value generated by the controller algorithm or the
input to the system u in the system state space model, there exists a safety matrix Su such that dot
product of safety matrix and their corresponding system input should be less than or equal to one.
If the controller generates the value to the actuators outside this region, then actuators will not be




We have designed an avionics based on the UAV simplex architecture. In this chapter, we discuss
about the hardware and software that are used in our custom built avionics.
4.1 Hardware
4.1.1 Sensors
We categorize sensors into two groups: basic and advanced sensors. Basic sensors include GP-
S/IMU, airspeed, and pressure sensors and they are essential to flight. For GPS/IMU, we use a
VectorNav VN-200 [8] module. For airspeed and pressure, we use an AMS 5812 pressure sensor
and a pitot tube. The basic sensors are shared by both safety and performance controllers. On
the other hand, advanced sensors are only used by the performance controller and considered not
essential to flight although they may increase performance of the system. The advanced sensors in-
clude, for example, radars and cameras, which can be used to implement advanced sense-and-avoid
capabilities. We are currently implementing a vision and radar based sense and avoid system.
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High Performance (HP) Platform















Rich OS (Linux), Middleware (ROS)
Figure 4.1: UAV simplex architecture
4.1.2 High Performance Platform
The HP platform is responsible for real-time processing of advanced sensors (e.g., vision and
radar) and sophisticated control algorithms to achieve high control performance and sense-and-
avoid capabilities. To satisfy the performance demand, we use Nvidia’s Tegra K1 processor, which
equips four ARM Cortex-A15 cores, running at 2.3 GHz, and 192 Kepler based GPU cores [31].
4.1.3 High Assurance Platform
The HA platform is ultimately responsible for safety of the system and therefore must be simple
and highly resistant to transient hardware faults. For this, we use an Arduino Due platform. The
platform equips a single-core Cortex-M3 processor with 80 MHz maximum operating frequency.
It is based on simple in-order architecture and the number of transistors of the chip is much smaller
than that of the Tegra K1. These characteristics make the HA platform less susceptible to SEUs.
Also, the platform supports numerous I/O options GPIO, PWM, I2C, and etc that are needed to
connect various basic sensors.
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4.2 Software
4.2.1 High Performance Controller
The performance controller is implemented on the Tegra K1. We use Ubuntu 12.04 Linux as the
OS and the Robot Operating System (ROS) as the middle ware framework. In ROS, the system,
a robot, is composed of a set of nodes, each of which is a separate Linux process participating
in the communication network for the robot. A node can publish messages to a communication
channel, called a topic, which can be subscribed by other nodes to receive the published messages.
Figure 4.2 shows the nodes and topics of the performance controller. In the figure, the controller
DG808 node is the main control node. The node subscribes the /vectornav/ins topic, to receive
GPS and IMU sensor values, and the /arduino/pwm, to receive commands from the remote con-
troller (RC) and pressure sensor values. (The RC is used for manual control of the UAV). The
controller node publishes control outputs to the servo_op topic, which is then subscribed by the
arduino node and is forwarded to the HA platform via serial. The MICORHARD ground station
node is responsible for communicating with the remote ground station on the laptop PC. We use the
open-source Qgroundcontrol [6] as the ground station software. We use a microhard modem for
long range communication [4] between the UAV and the ground station to send/receive statistics
(UAV to groundstation) and waypoints (groundstation to UAV) Currently, the performance con-
troller only uses the basic sensors, and it does not utilize radar and vision sensors; we are actively
developing radar and vision-based sense-and-avoid capability in the performance controller
4.2.2 High Assurance Controller
The safety controller runs on the Arduino Due platform. The control algorithm is a simple PID
based one [22] and it is modeled and validated using Matlab Simulink [7]. Figure 4.3 shows the
simulink model. We then generate C code of the controller using Matlab Simulink Coder. In this
way, we minimize the possibility of bugs in the safety controller, although it does not guarantee
the absence of bugs in the model. In fact, our initial model contained a divide zero bug, which was
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Figure 4.2: ROS based software architecture on the highperformance platform (Tegra K1)
manifested only in a certain sensor input value ranges. Nevertheless, model-based design is highly
desired for a safety controller as it can significantly reduce the possibility of coding mistakes and
other common software bugs [20, 16].
4.2.3 Decision Logic
The decision logic also runs on the Arduino Due, along with the safety controller. In fact, the
generated C code of the safety controller is merged with the decision logic. The safety controller
is directly called by the decision logic while the output of the performance controller is received
asynchronously from the Tegra K1 via serial. Which output is used to actuate the UAV is then
determined by the decision logic. Figure 4.4 shows the overall process of the decision logic. Note
that each loop is executed periodically at a regular interval (20Hz in our current implementation).
The implementation assumes that the safety controller always completes within the interval without
errors—i.e., out_hap is always valid and computed within the interval (deadline). On the other
hand, the output of the performance controller can be deemed unsafe or invalid due to a number of
reasons.
4.3 Fault Detection and Recovery
The decision logic detects faults in the HP platform by observing its outputs (See Line 14 in
Figure 4.4). Once a fault is identified, the decision logic switches its control to the safety controller
and tries to recover the HP platform by restarting the system.
Table II shows the observations by the decision logic and the corresponding faults at the HP
17
Figure 4.3: Autonomous controller block diagram
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1 void l oop ( )
2 {
3 / / b a s i c s e n s o r i n p u t
4 s e n s o r _ d a t a = r e a d _ s e n s o r s ( ) ;
5 send_to_HPP ( s e n s o r _ d a t a ) ;
6
7 / / e x e c u t e s a f e t y c o n t r o l l e r
8 ou t_hap = s a f e t y _ c o n t r o l l e r ( s e n s o r _ d a t a ) ;
9
10 / / w a i t f o r t h e per fo rmance c o n t r o l l e r
11 out_hpp = rece ive_f rom_HPP ( t i m e o u t ) ;
12
13 / / d e c i s i o n l o g i c
14 i f ( d e c i s i o n _ c h e c k ( s e n s o r _ d a t a , ou t_hpp ) ) ;
15 r u n _ s e r v o ( ou t_hpp ) ;
16 e l s e {
17 r u n _ s e r v o ( ou t_hap ) ;
18 / / r e c o v e r HPP
19 t r y _ r e c o v e r _ h p p ( ) ;
20 }
21
22 s l e e p _ u n t i l _ n e x t _ p e r i o d ( ) ;
23 }
24
25 i n t d e c i s i o n _ c h e c k ( s t a t e s , h p p _ o u t p u t )
26 {
27 / / c o n d i t i o n f o r f a u l t s check
28 i f ( d e t e c t _ f a u l t s ( ) )
29 re turn 0 ;
30
31 / / c o n d i t i o n s f o r s a f e t y check
32 / / check i f s y s t e m s t a t e s are i n s i d e s a f e t y r e g i o n
33 i f ( Sstates· s t a t e s ≥ 1)
34 re turn 0 ;
35 / / check i f HPP o u t p u t s are i n s i d e a c t u a t o r s a f e t y r e g i o n
36 i f ( Sactuators·h p p _ o u t p u t ≥ 1)
37 re turn 0 ;
38 }
Figure 4.4: Decision logic on Arduino.
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platform. First, ‘No output’ means that the decision logic does not receive performance controller’s
control outputs. This can be caused by software faults such as OS or controller crashes. In our cur-
rent implementation, the decision logic waits one more control period before it makes a switch to
the safety controller. If the outputs are received in the next period, the decision logic’s observation
is ‘Delayed output’ and the system continues to use the performance controller. The aircraft states
for every cycle, must be inside a safety region in order to maintain the stability of the system.
4.3.1 Safety Region
The safety region depends on the aircraft dynamics and hence this region varies from one aircraft
to another. The safety region for the UAV is defined based on Section 3.2. We added our custom
built avionics whose design is based on our UAV simplex architecture to a glider named DG808
that is shown in Figure 1.1. The safety region for this UAV is defined based on its states and the
inputs to the system.
The critical angle of attack for the DG808 glider is 30 deg 1. Therefore the safety region
containing the set of states where UAV will not have stall condition is given by,
S =
 0 1/30 0 0 0 0 0
















The actuators used in this UAV have their operation angles. The servo motors used for aileron
and rudder are capable of handling deflection angles from -15 to +15 deg where as the servo motor
1The critical angle of attack for DG808 was calculated using Advanced Aircraft Analysis software. [1].
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4.3.2 Decision Logic Conditions
In this section we define the decision logic conditions for DG808 glider. In every cycle, the outputs
of high performance platform are sent to the decision logic and evaluated against all the conditions
mentioned in this section. If the controller output is valid against all these conditions then the
decision logic says that high performance platform is not safe and allows it to handle the system.
The conditions are described using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) which is a mathematical language
for describing linear time properties [29].
4.3.2.1 Condition 1: Valid Controller Output
• Aim : To check whether the controller generates the outputs within the servo motor range.
The controller may diverge and produce outputs that cannot be handled by the servo motors
or the controller program might have crashed.
• LTL condition :
−15 deg ≤  aileron ≤ 15 deg (4.3)
−20 deg ≤  elevator ≤ 20 deg (4.4)
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−15 deg ≤  rudder ≤ 15 deg (4.5)
• Explanation : The controller generally produces aileron, elevator and rudder surface outputs.
These outputs are given to the servo motors. The servo motors have operation range. This
condition is used to verify whether the controller produces outputs within the operation range
or not.
4.3.2.2 Condition 2: Kalman Filter Divergence
• Aim : Most of the autonomous system will use kalman filters in their logic to estimate some
of the missing sensor values or to reduce the noise level in the sensor data. These kalman
filter, if designed with improper gains and coefficients, are highly unstable and will diverge
the controller.
• LTL condition : The controller program in our test bed estimates the side slip and angle of
attack.
−30 deg ≤  α ≤ 30 deg 2 (4.6)
Where α is the angle of attack
−30 deg ≤  β ≤ 30 deg 2 (4.7)
where β is the side slip angle
• Explanation : The side slip and angle of attack estimation should always be converged. If
this condition fails then the kalman filter has diverged. The failure of this condition is due to
improper value for the filter gains and co efficient. This failure will eventually lead to failure
of condition in the section 4.3.2.1.
2This value is calculated using AAA software [1] based on the vehicle dynamics.
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4.3.2.3 Condition 3: Sensor Communication with the Performance Controller
• Aim : In UAV simplex architecture, the performance controller is not directly connected to
the sensors. All the sensors are connected to the assurance platform and then passed to the
performance controller through a communication medium. In our glider UAV, we used the
USB communication between the platforms. Unfortunately, the USB communication is not
always reliable. The connection can be lost due to some vibrations to the system and it can
restored by re-spawning the program. In order to restore the communication, we currently
treat this as an safety issue and restart the performance platform.
• LTL condition : The high performance platform always monitors the USB health condition
and sends this health status to the decision logic in high assurance platform.
 USB |= T RUE (4.8)
where USB denotes the USB health status
• Explanation : The communication between high performance platform and the sensors is
always monitored by the high performance platform and this health condition should always
be good for the high performance controller. This failure will eventually lead to failure of
condition in the sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2.
4.3.2.4 Condition 4: Stall Speed Condition
• Aim : An aircraft will experience a stall condition when its angle of attack is greater than
threshold value.
• LTL condition :
 ((alt > alt0) → (vair > vstall )) (4.9)
where alt is the altitude measured and alt0 is the ground altitude, vair is the air speed mea-
sured by the sensor and vstall is the stall speed of the aircraft and its value depends on the
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flight dynamics.
• Explanation : In most of the small commercial UAVs, there is no dedicated sensor for mea-
suring this angle. But the stall condition can be checked using the altitude and air speed
measured from GPS sensor and the pitot tube respectively. The condition given in Equa-
tion 4.9 shows that when the aircraft is air bound identified by monitoring the altitude value
from GPS sensor, then the air speed of the vehicle should be always greater than the stall
speed. If this condition fails, then it indicates that the aircraft is climbing up at a high angle
such that the pitot tube is not able read the air speed.
4.3.2.5 Condition 5: FAA Regulation on Altitude
• Aim : The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has regulations like the commercial UAV
should always fly within 400 feet [3] from ground. This condition checks whether the high
performance controller is obeying this regulation.
• LTL condition :
(alt ≤ 400) (4.10)
• Explanation : When the high performance controller produces output that makes the aircraft
to climb altitude above 400 feet from ground level, then this condition fails and the decision




In this chapter, we evaluate our UAV simplex architecture through a case study using Hardware-
in-the-Loop (HiL) simulation. We also talk about the flight test using our custom built avionics.
More detailed explanation regarding the flight test is described in Section 5.2.
5.1 HiL Test
Hardware-in-the-Loop (HiL) simulation is a technique that is used for testing control systems.
In UAVs the physical parts (sensor and actuators) are connected with the cyber part(controller).
In HiL testing the physical parts are replaced by simulation(flight simulator) that can mimic the
sensors and actuators of the UAV.
5.1.1 Setup
Figure 5.1 shows the Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) experiment setup that we used to evaluate our
Simplex based UAV system. The experiment setup consists of an Arduino Due, a Tegra TK1,
and a laptop. The Arduino Due executes the safety controller and decision logic, while the Tegra
TK1 platform executes the performance controller. Together, they form the cyber system of the
UAV. On the other hand, the laptop runs the ground station and a custom built flight simulator.
The flight simulator, which is implemented in Matlab, provides simulated sensor values to both
25
Figure 5.1: Experiment setup for UAV simplex
the controllers and in turn receives the control command surface outputs from the controllers and
calculate the next inputs.
5.1.2 Case Study: Performance Controller Crash
In this case-study, we intentionally crash the performance controller in the HP platform to evaluate
the system’s ability to detect and recover from the fault.
Figure 5.3 shows the outputs of the performance controller (top), the safety controller (middle),
and the decision logic (bottom), collected over 200 seconds duration (Note that the figure shows
only one of the four control outputs.) For the first 100 seconds, both safety and performance
controllers are working in parallel on HA and HP platforms, respectively. In this normal operation
mode, the decision logic chooses to use the outputs of the performance controller. At 100 seconds,
however, we inject a fault by manually terminating the performance controller in the HP platform.
Because the decision logic observes no outputs from the performance controller, it switches to use
the outputs from the safety controller. At about 130 seconds, the performance controller is restarted
and produces control outputs. However, the decision logic does not immediately switch back to the
performance controller because the outputs of the performance controller is not stabilized yet. The
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Simple controller output is connected to the 
servos
Complex controller output is connected to the 
servos
Complex controller output is connected to the 
servos




P - Performance controller connected to servos
S - Secondary controller connected to servos
Figure 5.3: Outputs of safety controller, performance controller, and decision logic. A fault is
injected at time 100 second.
stability factor depends on the convergence of the filters and the guidance logic of the controller.
Once the outputs are stabilized, the decision logic switches back to use performance controller’s
outputs. Figure 5.2 shows the ground station tracking of the UAV system during the test. The solid
orange lines denote the waypoint trajectory uploaded to the UAV system from the ground station
and the red lines show the trajectory followed by the flight and the white dots represent the position
update from the UAV system on the ground station. Our UAV system is designed to update the
ground station at 10Hz.
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5.2 Flight Test
In this section, we discuss about the test that we conducted using our avionics (mentioned in
Chapter 4) in a real aircraft shown in Figure 1.1. In this test, we disabled the safety controller and
decision logic in high assurance platform. Instead, we used two performance controllers in high
performance platform and we manually switched the control from one performance controller to
another. The aim of this test was to ensure that the aircraft is stable, while switching the control
from one controller to another.
The test procedure was to takeoff the aircraft using pilot commanded RC values. Once the
aircraft reached a steady state, the autopilot was engaged. The way points required by the autopilot
was uploaded from the ground through ground station application. We integrated two autonomous
controller programs (“autopilot1 and autopilot2") in the high performance platform of our avionics.
Both the controllers mission was to follow the waypoints uploaded from ground station. Instead
of using decision logic to switch control from one controller program to another controller, the
ground station application was used for switching. We modified our avionics program to accept
the switching command from ground station to switch between the controllers. It can be seen from
the third sub plot in Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, the control was switched from one controller
to another. The sub plot shows us that at 270th second of the test, value in this plot has changed
from ‘0’ to ‘1’ indicating that the avionics has switched the control from “autopilot1" controller
to “autopilot2" controller. The control was again switched back to “autopilot1" controller at 350th
second of the flight test. The switching between controllers was repeated in the shorter and longer
leg of the mission trajectory to see any sort of instability or rough transition.
We have recorded the video of ground station during the test. The details about this video is
mentioned in Apendix A.
Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 shows the states of the system while it was in autopilot. The x-axis
of the figures shows the time in seconds and the y-axis shows the angles in deg and rates in deg/s
respectively. It can be seen from the figures that there was no sudden spike in any states during
the switch between controllers (at 270th, 350th and 380th second of the flight test) and there was no
29
Figure 5.4: Accelerator values measured from flight test, X-axis: Time in seconds, Y-axis: Accel-
eration in G
Figure 5.5: Aircraft orientation in Euler angles measured from flight test, X-axis: Time in seconds,
Y-axis: Euler angles in degrees
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Figure 5.6: Body rates measured from flight test, X-axis: Time in seconds, Y-axis: Body rates in
deg/s
Figure 5.7: Aircraft velocity measured from flight test, X-axis: Time in seconds, Y-axis: velocity
in ft/s
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Figure 5.8: Rosgraph plot showing the nodes and topics and for the switch between controllers
case
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instability in the system behavior, thus the switching between the controllers in the middle of the
mission was smooth while following the mission.
However, the above test did not include the decision module for fault detection because the
aim of the test was to see the stability of the aircraft, after switching the controller. In this test, the
switch between the controllers was initiated by the ground station operator. Figure 5.8 shows the
ROS software architecture of the test. As a future work, we plan to integrate the decision logic and
do a flight test with fault injection.
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Chapter 6
COTS Autopilot with UAV Simplex
Architecture
In UAV simplex architecture, two different hardware platforms were used. They were classified as
High Performance platform and High Assurance platform. So far, we have used an ARM Cortex-
M3 based custom built computing board as the HA platform, which runs the decision logic and the
safety controller.
The realization of UAV simplex architecture was hindered by this custom built board since it
takes more time and cost to develop and verify. Hence in this chapter, we replaced the custom built
board with an available COTS autopilot that also provides sensor acquisition and a simple mission
controller. We used Pixhawk [5] as our COTS autopilot along with our onboard computer.
Pixhawk, as shown in Figure 6.1, is a famous COTS autpilot that also provides easy interface
to connect with an on board computer and runs a simple PID controller that follows the uploaded
mission from ground station. Pixhawk uses a cortex-M4F processor that operates at 168 MHz. It
also provides 14 PWM pins, that are required for the servo motors and supports peripherals like I2C
and CAN, that are essential for communicating with the sensor. However, the main advantage of
using Pixhawk over our custom built avionics is the that, the Pixhawk software framework provides
integration support to the sensors required for an UAV. Whereas, in our custom built avionics, we
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Figure 6.1: Pixhawk outer view
need to take care of sensor integration.
6.1 Implementation
The following steps are involved in replacing the custom built avionics board with the Pixhawk
COTS board.
The pixhawk board comes with two telemetry ports. These ports output all the sensor data
encrypted using mavlink protocol. The telemetry port 1 will be always used for communication
with ground station. Hence the communication between pixhawk and the onboard computer is
established using a usb2ttl converter between telemetry port 2 and the onboard computer.
The mavlink encrypted data is available to the onboard computer. These data should be de-
crypted before sending them to the complex controller algorithm. The ROS provides a mavlink
encryption and decryption package called MAVROS. MAVROS decrypts these data and publishes
sensor data. To support our complex controller, an extra ROS node is implemented that converts
the sensor data from MAVROS topic to the topics supported by the complex controller node.
The Figure 6.2 shows the rosgraph containing all the nodes and topics in this setup. Once the
inputs are given to the on board controller algorithm, the output will be generated. The pixhawk
also generates its output value. The values generated by the pixhawk should be replaced with the
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Figure 6.2: ROS nodes outline for PX4 and the controller program
values from the on board computer. For this, Pixhawk supports the offboard mode that rewrites its
output with the on board computer’s output.
6.2 HiL Test
The UAV simplex architecture using the Pixhawk is in Hardware In the Loop simulation. The
setup consists of the following applications.
1. Xplane Flight gear simulator: Xplane [9] simulator runs the model of the aircraft and it
takes the controller output as its input and generates the states. These states are sent to the
controller program.
2. QGround station: The states generated by the Xplane are delivered to the controller program
running in the pixhawk through Qground station. The Qground station is connected with the
Pixhawk and communicates with the Xplane using UDP communication.
The Qground station receives all the state information from Xplane. Then, Qground station
encrypts the values using mavlink protocol. The mavlink encrypted values are given to the on board
computer. The on board computer generates the control output based on the state information and
sent them to Xplane through Qground station.
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Figure 6.3: Hardware in the Loop for PX4 as the safety platform
In this work, we have not added the decision logic into the Pixhawk. The Pixhawk will auto-
matically switch its mode from "offboard" to "return to land" when it stops receiving the values
from on board computer. This feature provides safety against the fail stop case. But it cannot detect
and recover from the unsafe output conditions. Adding the decision logic into the Pixhawk is our
future work.
6.3 Aircraft Setup using Pixhawk and On Board Computer
We have installed the avionics containing Pixhawk (as a HA platform) and an Odroid-XU4 board
(as a HP platform). As shown in the Figure 6.4, this is the avionics setup installed in the aircraft
named Skyhunter.
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We have presented a fault-tolerant UAV design based on the Simplex [35] architecture. The pro-
posed design uses two heterogeneous platforms with distinct reliability and performance charac-
teristics.
Our main idea is that we use a reliable but less performance hardware platform, we call a
High-Assurance (HA) platform, to be responsible for safety while we use a more performance, but
potentially less reliable platform, which we call a High- Performance (HP) platform, for perfor-
mance and intelligence of the UAV. During the normal operation, the HP platform is responsible
for controlling the UAV. However, if it fails due to transient hardware faults or software bugs,
the HA platform will immediately take over until the HP platform recovers. As such, our design
provides a much needed fail-operational property in the UAV.
We have implemented the proposed design on an actual UAV using a low-cost Arduino and a
high-performance Tegra TK1 platform. We have demonstrated the system’s ability to detect and
recover from failures through a set of experiments in a hardware-in-the-loop simulation setting.
We did a flight test to show that the system is stable after switching between the controllers. We
have also showed using hardware in the loop simulation that UAV simplex architecture can be
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We have made few videos showing our HiL test
1) The Hardware in the Loop simulation using our custom built avionics, showing fault toler-
ance against the crash fault video can be found in this link https://youtu.be/p6BT3UN8qJE
2) The video playback of the ground station during the real flight test with switch between




Issues Faced and Solved
This appendix includes information about some of the issues that we faced and solved while inte-
grating and using our avionics, matlab code generation and in bench test.
B.1 Divide by Zero
We are using kalman filters in our controller program for prediction and estimation of the system
states. Divide by zero occured at the estimation of ‘VT’, the true velocity which is calculated using
the pressure value from the ‘pitot tube’. Pitot tube is connected to a differential pressure sensor.
When the UAV system is static in ground, it reads zero pressure that results in zero velocity value.
This zero velocity is given to the kalman filter block as seen in Figure B.1. This block outputs
‘NaN’ and will cause the controller to diverge. We fixed this issue by giving a small constant value
to the velocity, when it reads zero in ground.
Figure B.1: Estimation of True velocity
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Figure B.2: Matlab code to convert GPS position from global to local
B.2 Structure Ordering
The autonomous controller in initial stages, is designed using Matlab. For the guidance block(guides
in following the mission) in autonomous controller, the GPS position in local frame is required.
Usually, all GPS sensors output GPS values in global frame. Hence we need to convert them from
global to local frame. The Figure B.2 shows the Matlab code to convert the GPS position from
global to local frame. The conversion consist of current GPS position in global frame, reference
position in global frame and conversion factor based on the reference position. We use Matlab
Embedded code generator to generate C code from the autonomous controller Matlab files. The
Figure B.3 shows the generated C code. In generated code, the values of the conversion factor
based on the reference position and the reference position in global frame are interchanged. This
interchanged values lead to wrong guidance values. Hence the aircraft in hardware in the loop
testing did not follow the mission. The reason for this value interchange in the generated code
was, these variables are created as structures. The order in which the elements inside this structure
was different from the order in which the elements inside the structure was defined. This declara-
tion and definition mismatch showed no impact on Matlab simulation, but in code generation, this
mismatch was reflected. This issue was resolved by following uniform structure order during its
declaration and definition.
B.3 USB Hub Power Issue
In our avionics, we used usb connection to connect with our custom built data acquisition board,
with GPS and IMU sensor and with the telemetry module to communicate with the ground station.
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Figure B.3: Matlab generated C code to convert GPS position from global to local
Figure B.4: Picture of our avionics containing a usb hub
In order to support all the usb connections, we use an non powered usb hub as shown in Figure B.4.
The Vector Nav VN-200 sensor [8](GPS and IMU) draws current from the usb hub to operate.
Since we were using a non powered hub, the current drawn by the hub from the processing board
was not sufficient, the VN-200 sensor values had a huge variation for successive reading. This huge
variation caused our autonomous controller to diverge (NaN values). this issue was resolved by
using a powered usb hub. Though the powered usb hub resolved the VN-200 sensor data issue, it
produced another issue during flight tests. The aircraft that we used had small area to accommodate
the avionics. Hence the avionics and the usb hub were placed very close to each other. The avionics
and the usb hub inside the aircraft are covered using the aircraft’s canopy. Somehow, this canopy
put more pressure on the power cables to the usb hub and the power line to hub was broken. Since
the hub was not powered the controller program did not receive any values from the sensors, that
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resulted in landing the aircraft. This issue was fixed by soldering the power cables.
We have encountered other hardware related issues, like battery used in the aircraft did not
provide enough power to motor. This added difficulty in aircraft take off. Another issue that we
faced is, the motor mount got broken while the aircraft was flying. The pitot tube, required for
measuring the air speed, was not reading proper values. This happened because the tube was




We have included the instructions to install our avionics in this appendix. In this thesis, we used
Tegra K1. We have included the bash commands detailed instructions on setting up the Tegra K1
processor.
C.1 Software Dependencies
1. OS - Ubuntu
2. Middleware - ROS
C.2 Installing our Avionics Code
All our code are maintained in our github repository [37]. Clone our repository inside the ROS
workspace. After building the code, the avionics is ready to install into the aircraft. The description
about each folder in our repository is as follows:
1. aircraft: This folder contains all the Matlab and generated C codes of our test aircrafts.
2. autopilot_releases: This folder contains all the Matlab files that are required for the simula-
tion tests.
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3. launch: This folder contains all the ROS launch files that are created for each aircarft. This
launch file calls all the required programs like sensor data reading, controller and ground
station communication.
4. mavlink: We use mavlink protocol to communicate with the ground station. his folder con-
tains library files for supporting mavlink.
5. msg: ROS using topics to publish and subscribe from other nodes. This folder contains the
structure for all custom messages.
6. src: This folder contains all the source files. This includes the main controller program,




This appendix lists the source code for important programs we developed for the avionics.
D.1 Controller Function Code
This is the most important code. It subscribes all the sensor data and assigns it to Matlab generated
variables. It calls the controller function and then it publishes the controller output.
1 /∗∗
2 ∗ @ f i l e c o n t r o l l e r _ D G 8 0 8 . cpp
3 ∗ @author P r a s a n t h Vivekanandan




8 # d e f i n e DEBUG 1
9 # i n c l u d e < r o s / r o s . h>
10 # i n c l u d e < s t d d e f . h>
11 # i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
12 # i n c l u d e < t ime . h>
13 # i n c l u d e < u n i s t d . h>
14 # i n c l u d e < i n t t y p e s . h>
15 # i n c l u d e < u n i s t d . h>
16 # i n c l u d e < g e t o p t . h>
17 # i n c l u d e < s t d l i b . h>
18 # i n c l u d e <math . h>
19
20 # i n c l u d e "DG808_GNC_mov . c "
21 # i n c l u d e " rtGetNaN . c "
22 # i n c l u d e " r t _ n o n f i n i t e . c "
23 # i n c l u d e " r t G e t I n f . c "
24 # i n c l u d e " r t w t y p e s . h "
25 # i n c l u d e " h e l p e r s . h "
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26
27 # i n c l u d e < d r o n e _ r o s / i n s . h>
28 # i n c l u d e < d r o n e _ r o s /pwm. h>
29 # i n c l u d e < d r o n e _ r o s / d a t a . h>
30 # i n c l u d e < d r o n e _ r o s / way . h>
31 # i n c l u d e < d r o n e _ r o s / h i l _ d a t a . h>
32
33 / / messgae l i b r a r y f o r GPS p o s i t i o n
34 # i n c l u d e " senso r_msgs / NavSatFix . h "
35 / / message l i b r a r y f o r GPS v e l o c i t y
36 # i n c l u d e " geometry_msgs / Twis t . h "
37 / / message l i b r a r y f o r PQR and a c c e l e r a t i o n
38 # i n c l u d e " senso r_msgs / Imu . h "
39 / / message l i b r a r y f o r Phi , The ta and P s i
40 # i n c l u d e " geometry_msgs / P o i n t . h "
41 # i n c l u d e " senso r_msgs / Tempera tu r e . h "
42 # i n c l u d e " senso r_msgs / F l u i d P r e s s u r e . h "
43 # i n c l u d e " senso r_msgs / B a t t e r y S t a t e . h "
44 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
45 ∗ P u b l i c D e f i n i t i o n s
46 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
47 # d e f i n e PDEBUG( fmt , . . . ) \




52 ∗ P u b l i c Types
53 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
54 # d e f i n e SAVEFILE 1
55 # d e f i n e DEG2RAD 0.0174532925
56 # d e f i n e GRAVITY 9 . 8
57 # d e f i n e DENSITY 0.002295
58 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
59 ∗ Globa l V a r i a b l e s
60 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
61 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r g _ p u b _ d a t a _ a r d u i n o ;
62 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r g_pub_da t a_gs ;
63
64
65 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r g _ p u b _ d a t a _ h i l ; / / used t o p u b l i s h da ta t o t h e Hardware In t h e Loop node
66 void c a l l _ c o n t r o l l e r ( ) ;
67
68
69 s t d : : s t r i n g g _ c o n t r o l l e r _ f r a m e _ i d ;
70
71 s t r u c t u s b _ s t a t u s _ s t r u c t u s b _ s t a t u s ; / / S t o r e s t h e h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n o f USB d e v i c e s ; Used by t h e d e c i s i o n l o g i c b l o c k i n t h e
au to g e n e r a t e d code
72 s t r u c t p w m _ c o n v e r s i o n _ s t r u c t p w m _ c o n v e r s i o n _ f a c t o r s ; / / S t r u c t u r e t o s t o r e t h e c o n v e r s i o n f a c t o r s f o r each s u r f a c e s
73 s t r u c t h e l p e r s _ s t r u c t h e l p e r s ; / / To be used i n ROS s u b s c r i p t i o n i n l o g node and c o n t r o l l e r node
74
75 ExtU_DG808_GNC_mov_T ∗ c o n t r o l l e r _ i n = &DG808_GNC_mov_U ;
76 ExtY_DG808_GNC_mov_T ∗ c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t = &DG808_GNC_mov_Y ;
77 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
78 ∗ P u b l i c F u n c t i o n P r o t o t y p e s
79 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ /
80 void send_pwm ( ) ;
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82 u i n t 6 4 _ t g e t _ e l a p s e d ( s t r u c t t i m e s p e c ∗ s t a r t , s t r u c t t i m e s p e c ∗end )
83 {
84 u i n t 6 4 _ t dur = ( end−>t v _ s e c ∗ 1000000000 + end−>t v _ n s e c ) −
85 ( s t a r t −>t v _ s e c ∗ 1000000000 + s t a r t −>t v _ n s e c ) ;
86 re turn dur ;
87 }
88
89 double g e t _ t i m e ( s t r u c t t i m e s p e c ∗c a l c , s t r u c t t i m e s p e c ∗c a l c 1 )
90 {
91 double dur = ( ( double ) c a l c 1−>t v _ s e c + ( ( double ) c a l c 1−>t v _ n s e c /1000000000) ) −
( ( double ) c a l c−>t v _ s e c + ( ( double ) c a l c−>t v _ n s e c /1000000000) ) ;
92
93 re turn dur ;
94 }
95
96 void pwm_cal lback ( c o n s t d r o n e _ r o s : : pwm : : C o n s t P t r & msg )
97 {
98
99 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . t h r o t t l e _ c m d = msg−> T h r o t t l e ;
100 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . e l e v a t o r _ c m d = msg−>E l e v a t o r ;
101 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . a i l e r o n _ c m d = msg−>A i l e r o n ;
102 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . rudder_cmd = msg−>Rudder ;
103 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>VTalphabetameas . VT = msg−> v e l o c i t y ;
104
105 i f ( msg−>PICCIC == 1) {
106 i f ( h e l p e r s . SAS_flag == 2)
107 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC = 0 ;
108 e l s e
109 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC = 1 ;
110 }
111 i f ( msg−>PICCIC == 0) {
112 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC = 0 ;
113 / / t r i m up da t e
114 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> t h r o t t l e t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ;
115 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> e l e v a t o r t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . e l e v a t o r _ c m d ;
116 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> a i l e r o n t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . a i l e r o n _ c m d ;
117 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>r u d d e r t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . rudder_cmd ;
118
119 }




124 void D A Q _ p re s s u r e _ c a l l b a c k ( c o n s t senso r_msgs : : F l u i d P r e s s u r e : : C o n s t P t r & m s g _ p r e s s u r e )
125 {
126 h e l p e r s . p r e s s u r e = msg_pres su re−> f l u i d _ p r e s s u r e ;
127 }
128
129 void DAQ_vo l t age_ca l lback ( c o n s t senso r_msgs : : B a t t e r y S t a t e : : C o n s t P t r & m s g _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e )
130 {




135 void w a y _ c a l l b a c k ( c o n s t d r o n e _ r o s : : way : : C o n s t P t r & msg_waypoin ts )
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136 {
137 ROS_INFO_STREAM( " f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g w a y p o i n t s " ) ;
138 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>WaypointsIN . rp = 1 ;
139 f o r ( i n t w=0;w<32;w++)
140 {
141 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>WaypointsIN . n [w] = msg_waypoints−>n o r t h [w ] ;
142 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>WaypointsIN . e [w] = msg_waypoints−> e a s t [w ] ;
143 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>WaypointsIN . h [w] = msg_waypoints−>h e i g h t [w ] ;
144 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>WaypointsIN . v [w] = msg_waypoints−> v e l o c i t y [w ] ;
145 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>WaypointsIN . fp = msg_waypoints−>fp ;
146 }
147 p r i n t f ( " t h e way p o i n t a r e %f %f %f %f " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>WaypointsIN . n [ 0 ] ,




152 void g p s _ c a l l b a c k ( c o n s t d r o n e _ r o s : : i n s : : C o n s t P t r & msg_gps_imu )
153 {
154 ROS_INFO_STREAM( " f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g gps s i g n a l s " ) ;
155 u s b _ s t a t u s . u s b _ v e c t o r n a v = msg_gps_imu−> u s b s t a t u s ;
156 h e l p e r s . g ps _ t i m e = msg_gps_imu−>t ime ;




161 void g p s _ p o s i t i o n _ c a l l b a c k ( c o n s t senso r_msgs : : NavSatF ix : : C o n s t P t r & m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n )
162 {
163 ROS_INFO_STREAM( " f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g g p s _ p o s i t i o n " ) ;
164 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPos i t ionmeas . L a t i t u d e = m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n−> l a t i t u d e ;
165 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPos i t ionmeas . L o n g i t u d e = m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n−> l o n g i t u d e ;
166 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPos i t ionmeas . A l t i t u d e = m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n−> a l t i t u d e ;
167 # i f HIL_TEST
168 c a l l _ c o n t r o l l e r ( ) ;
169 # e n d i f
170 }
171
172 void g p s _ v e l o c i t y _ c a l l b a c k ( c o n s t geometry_msgs : : Twis t : : C o n s t P t r & m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y )
173 {
174 ROS_INFO_STREAM( " f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g g p s _ v e l o c i t y " ) ;
175 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_nor th = m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y−> l i n e a r . x ;
176 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_eas t = m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y−> l i n e a r . y ;
177 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_down = m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y−> l i n e a r . z ;
178 }
179
180 void i m u _ P Q R _ a c c e l e r a t i o n _ c a l l b a c k ( c o n s t senso r_msgs : : Imu : : C o n s t P t r & msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion )
181 {
182 ROS_INFO_STREAM( " f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g i m u _ P Q R _ a c c e l e r a t i o n " ) ;
183 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>BodyRatesmeas . P = msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion−> a n g u l a r _ v e l o c i t y . x ;
184 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>BodyRatesmeas .Q = msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion−> a n g u l a r _ v e l o c i t y . y ;
185 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>BodyRatesmeas . R = msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion−> a n g u l a r _ v e l o c i t y . z ;
186 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>A cc e l e r om e t e r me as . Axb = msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion−> l i n e a r _ a c c e l e r a t i o n . x ;
187 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>A cc e l e r om e t e r me as . Ayb = msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion−> l i n e a r _ a c c e l e r a t i o n . y ;
188 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>A cc e l e r om e t e r me as . Azb = msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion−> l i n e a r _ a c c e l e r a t i o n . z ;
189 }
190
191 void i m u _ a t t i t u d e _ c a l l b a c k ( c o n s t geometry_msgs : : P o i n t : : C o n s t P t r & m s g _ i m u _ a t t i t u d e )
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192 {
193 ROS_INFO_STREAM( " f i n i s h e d r e a d i n g i m u _ a t t i t u d e " ) ;
194 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Eule rAng le smeas . p h i = m s g _ i m u _ a t t i t u d e−>x ;
195 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Eule rAng le smeas . t h e t a = m s g _ i m u _ a t t i t u d e−>y ;
196 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Eule rAng le smeas . p s i = m s g _ i m u _ a t t i t u d e−>z ;
197 }
198
199 void s e n d _ h i l _ o u t p u t ( )
200 {
201 d r o n e _ r o s : : h i l _ d a t a m s g _ t o _ h i l ;
202 m s g _ t o _ h i l . c o n t r o l l e r _ t h r o t t l e _ o u t p u t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ;
203 m s g _ t o _ h i l . c o n t r o l l e r _ e l e v a t o r _ o u t p u t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . e l e v a t o r _ c m d ;
204 m s g _ t o _ h i l . c o n t r o l l e r _ a i l e r o n _ o u t p u t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . a i l e r o n _ c m d ;
205 m s g _ t o _ h i l . c o n t r o l l e r _ r u d d e r _ o u t p u t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . rudder_cmd ;
206 m s g _ t o _ h i l . d i s t _ 2 _ w a y p o i n t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>D i s t a n c e t o W a y p o i n t ;
207 m s g _ t o _ h i l . w a y p o i n t _ i n d e x = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Waypoin t Index ;
208 m s g _ t o _ h i l . guidance_VT = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>CommandedStates . VT_cmd ;
209 m s g _ t o _ h i l . g u i d a n c e _ p h i = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>CommandedStates . phi_cmd ;
210 m s g _ t o _ h i l . g u i d a n c e _ t h e t a = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>CommandedStates . t he t a_cmd ;
211 m s g _ t o _ h i l . e t a _ L a t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>TrackAngles . e t a L a t ;
212 m s g _ t o _ h i l . e t a_Lon = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>TrackAngles . e t aLon ;
213 m s g _ t o _ h i l . n_op = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>n_mov_pt [ 0 ] ;
214 m s g _ t o _ h i l . e_op = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>e_mov_pt [ 0 ] ;
215 m s g _ t o _ h i l . h_op = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>h_mov_pt [ 0 ] ;
216 g _ p u b _ d a t a _ h i l . p u b l i s h ( m s g _ t o _ h i l ) ;
217 }
218 /∗∗
219 ∗ up da t e a message t o be s e n t t o t h e micro hd ROS node
220 ∗ /
221 void s e t _ g r o u n d _ d a t a ( d r o n e _ r o s : : d a t a ∗ msg_data )
222 {
223 msg_data−>h e a d e r . f r a m e _ i d = g _ c o n t r o l l e r _ f r a m e _ i d ;
224 msg_data−>a n g l e . x = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Eule rAng le smeas . p h i ;
225 msg_data−>a n g l e . y = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Eule rAng le smeas . t h e t a ;
226 msg_data−>a n g l e . z = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Eule rAng le smeas . p s i ;
227 msg_data−> l l a . x = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPos i t ionmeas . L a t i t u d e ;
228 msg_data−> l l a . y = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPos i t ionmeas . L o n g i t u d e ;
229 msg_data−> l l a . z = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPos i t ionmeas . A l t i t u d e ;
230 msg_data−> v e l o c i t y . x = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_nor th ;
231 msg_data−> v e l o c i t y . y = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_eas t ;
232 msg_data−> v e l o c i t y . z = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_down ;
233 msg_data−>a n g r a t e . x = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>BodyRatesmeas . P ;
234 msg_data−>a n g r a t e . y = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>BodyRatesmeas .Q;
235 msg_data−>a n g r a t e . z = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>BodyRatesmeas . R ;
236 msg_data−>PICCIC = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC ;
237 msg_data−>HomeCmd = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>HomeCmd ;
238 msg_data−> T h r o t t l e = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ;
239 msg_data−>E l e v a t o r = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . e l e v a t o r _ c m d /DEG2RAD;
240 msg_data−>Rudder = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . rudder_cmd /DEG2RAD;
241 msg_data−>A i l e r o n = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>RC . a i l e r o n _ c m d /DEG2RAD;
242 msg_data−> a c c e l e r a t i o n . x = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>A cc e l e r om e t e r me as . Axb ;
243 msg_data−> a c c e l e r a t i o n . y = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>A cc e l e r om e t e r me as . Ayb ;
244 msg_data−> a c c e l e r a t i o n . z = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>A cc e l e r om e t e r me as . Azb ;
245 msg_data−> p r e s s u r e = h e l p e r s . p r e s s u r e ;
246 msg_data−>v o l t a g e = h e l p e r s . v o l t a g e ;
247 msg_data−> a i r _ v e l o c i t y = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>VTalphabetameas . VT;
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248 msg_data−> a l p h a e s t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> v t a l p h a b e t a _ e s t . a l p h a ;
249 msg_data−> b e t a e s t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> v t a l p h a b e t a _ e s t . b e t a ;
250
251 msg_data−>t ime = h e l p e r s . g p s_ t i m e ;
252 msg_data−>week = h e l p e r s . gps_week ;
253 / / f o r ( i n t y =0;y <4; y++)
254 msg_data−> a u t o t h r o t t l e =
255 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ;
256 msg_data−> a u t o e l e v a t o r =
257 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . e l e v a t o r _ c m d /
258 DEG2RAD;
259 msg_data−> a u t o a i l e r o n =
260 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . a i l e r o n _ c m d /
261 DEG2RAD;
262 msg_data−>a u t o r u d d e r =
263 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . rudder_cmd / DEG2RAD;
264 msg_data−>d2b = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>D i s t a n c e t o W a y p o i n t ;
265 msg_data−> a _ u s b s t a t u s = u s b _ s t a t u s . u s b _ a r d u i n o ;
266 msg_data−> v _ u s b s t a t u s = u s b _ s t a t u s . u s b _ v e c t o r n a v ;
267 msg_data−>guidance_VT = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>CommandedStates . VT_cmd ;
268
269 msg_data−>g u i d a n c e _ t h e t a = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>CommandedStates . t he t a_cmd ;
270 msg_data−>g u i d a n c e _ p h i = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>CommandedStates . phi_cmd ;
271 msg_data−>g u i d a n c e _ b e t a = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>CommandedStates . beta_cmd ;
272 msg_data−> t r a c k a n g l e s _ e t a L a t = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>TrackAngles . e t a L a t ;
273 msg_data−>t r a c k a n g l e s _ e t a L o n = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>TrackAngles . e t aLon ;
274 msg_data−>a u t o _ s w i t c h = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC ;
275 msg_data−> a n g l e s _ e s t [ 0 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> a n g l e s _ e s t . p h i ;
276 msg_data−> a n g l e s _ e s t [ 1 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> a n g l e s _ e s t . t h e t a ;
277 msg_data−> a n g l e s _ e s t [ 2 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> a n g l e s _ e s t . p s i ;
278
279 msg_data−> b r a t e s _ e s t [ 0 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> b r a t e s _ e s t . P ;
280 msg_data−> b r a t e s _ e s t [ 1 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> b r a t e s _ e s t .Q;
281 msg_data−> b r a t e s _ e s t [ 2 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> b r a t e s _ e s t . R ;
282
283 msg_data−> a c c e l _ e s t [ 0 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> a c c e l e r o m e t e r _ e s t . Axb ;
284 msg_data−> a c c e l _ e s t [ 1 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> a c c e l e r o m e t e r _ e s t . Ayb ;
285 msg_data−> a c c e l _ e s t [ 2 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> a c c e l e r o m e t e r _ e s t . Azb ;
286
287 msg_data−>p o s _ e s t [ 0 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>g p s p o s _ e s t . L a t i t u d e ;
288 msg_data−>p o s _ e s t [ 1 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>g p s p o s _ e s t . L o n g i t u d e ;
289 msg_data−>p o s _ e s t [ 2 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>g p s p o s _ e s t . A l t i t u d e ;
290
291 msg_data−> v e l _ e s t [ 0 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> g p s v e l _ e s t . V_nor th ;
292 msg_data−> v e l _ e s t [ 1 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> g p s v e l _ e s t . V_eas t ;
293 msg_data−> v e l _ e s t [ 2 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> g p s v e l _ e s t . V_down ;
294
295 msg_data−>w i n d _ e s t [ 0 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> i n e r t i a l w i n d _ e s t .VwN;
296 msg_data−>w i n d _ e s t [ 1 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> i n e r t i a l w i n d _ e s t .VwE;
297 msg_data−>w i n d _ e s t [ 2 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> i n e r t i a l w i n d _ e s t .VwH;
298
299 msg_data−> t h r o t t l e t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> t h r o t t l e t r i m ;
300 msg_data−> e l e v a t o r t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> e l e v a t o r t r i m ;
301 msg_data−> a i l e r o n t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> a i l e r o n t r i m ;
302 msg_data−>r u d d e r t r i m = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>r u d d e r t r i m ;
303
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304 msg_data−>SAS_switch = c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>SASswitch ;
305 msg_data−> d e l t a _ p s i = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −> d e l t a _ p s i ;
306
307 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i <6 ; i ++) {
308 msg_data−>mw_height [ i ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Modi f ied_wpt . h [ i ] ;
309 msg_data−>mw_north [ i ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Modi f ied_wpt . n [ i ] ;
310 msg_data−>mw_east [ i ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Modi f ied_wpt . e [ i ] ;
311 msg_data−>mw_veloc i ty [ i ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Modi f ied_wpt . v [ i ] ;
312 }
313 msg_data−>n_op = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>n_mov_pt [ 0 ] ;
314 msg_data−>e_op = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>e_mov_pt [ 0 ] ;
315 msg_data−>h_op = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>h_mov_pt [ 0 ] ;
316 msg_data−>w a y p o i n t _ i n d e x = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Waypoin t Index ;
317 }
318
319 / / c a l l t h e c o n t r o l l e r s f o r HiL t e s t i n g
320 void c a l l _ c o n t r o l l e r ( )
321 {
322 # i f HIL_TEST
323 DG808_GNC_mov_step ( ) ;
324 send_pwm ( ) ;
325 s e n d _ h i l _ o u t p u t ( ) ;
326 d r o n e _ r o s : : d a t a msg_data ;
327 s e t _ g r o u n d _ d a t a (& msg_data ) ;
328 g_pub_da t a_gs . p u b l i s h ( msg_data ) ;
329 # e n d i f
330 }
331
332 void ass ign_se rvo_commands ( )
333 {
334 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>ServoCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ;
335 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>ServoCommands . e l e v a t o r _ c m d = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . e l e v a t o r _ c m d ;
336 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>ServoCommands . a i l e r o n _ c m d = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . a i l e r o n _ c m d ;
337 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>ServoCommands . rudder_cmd = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . rudder_cmd ;
338 }
339
340 void a s s i g n _ s e r v o _ d f e f l e c t i o n s ( )
341 {
342 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> S e r v o d e f l e c t i o n [ 0 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSur faceCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ;
343 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> S e r v o d e f l e c t i o n [ 1 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSur faceCommands . e l e v a t o r _ c m d ;
344 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> S e r v o d e f l e c t i o n [ 2 ] = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSur faceCommands . a i l e r o n _ c m d ;





350 void send_pwm ( )
351 {
352 d r o n e _ r o s : : pwm msg_servo ;
353 msg_servo . T h r o t t l e = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ;
354 msg_servo . E l e v a t o r = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . e l e v a t o r _ c m d ;
355 msg_servo . A i l e r o n = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . a i l e r o n _ c m d ;
356 msg_servo . Rudder = c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSur faceCommands . rudder_cmd ;




360 void s e l f t e s t ( f l o a t t h r o t t l e , f l o a t e l e v a t o r , f l o a t a i l e r o n , f l o a t r u d d e r )
361 {
362 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d = t h r o t t l e ;
363 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . e l e v a t o r _ c m d = e l e v a t o r ;
364 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . a i l e r o n _ c m d = a i l e r o n ;
365 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Contro lSurfaceCommands . rudder_cmd = r u d d e r ;
366 send_pwm ( ) ;
367 }
368
369 i n t a u t o _ t e s t ( i n t t i m e c h e c k )
370 {
371 PDEBUG( " \ n The t ime i n a u t o p i l o t r o u t i n e i s %d " , t i m e c h e c k ) ;
372 f l o a t u p _ l i m i t = 10 ∗ DEG2RAD;
373 f l o a t d o w n _ l i m i t = −10 ∗ DEG2RAD;
374 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k >= 0) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 1) ) / / t i m e r > 0 and < 1 s e c
375 {
376 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
377 }
378 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 1) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 4) ) / / t i m e r > 1 and < 4 s e c
379 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , u p _ l i m i t , 0 ) ; / / p o s i t i v e a i l e r o n
380 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 4) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 5) ) / / t i m e r > 4 and < 5 s e c
381 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
382 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 5) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 8) ) / / t i m e r > 5 and < 8 s e c
383 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , down_l imi t , 0 ) ; / / n e g a t i v e a i l e r o n
384 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 8) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 9) ) / / t i m e r > 8 and < 9 s e c
385 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
386 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 9) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 12) ) / / t i m e r > 9 and < 12 s e c
387 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , u p _ l i m i t , 0 , 0 ) ; / / p o s i t i v e e l e v a t o r
388 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 12) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 13) ) / / t i m e r > 12 and < 13 s e c
389 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
390 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 13) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 16) ) / / t i m e r > 13 and < 16 s e c
391 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , down_l imi t , 0 , 0 ) ; / / n e g a t i v e e l e v a t o r
392 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 16) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 17) ) / / t i m e r > 16 and < 17 s e c
393 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
394 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 17) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 20) ) / / t i m e r > 17 and < 20 s e c
395 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , u p _ l i m i t ) ; / / p o s i t i v e ru dd er
396 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 20) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 21) ) / / t i m e r > 20 and < 21 s e c
397 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
398 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 21) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 24) ) / / t i m e r > 21 and < 24 s e c
399 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , d o w n _ l i m i t ) ; / / n e g a t i v e ru dd er
400 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 24) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 26) ) / / t i m e r > 24 and < 25 s e c
401 s e l f t e s t ( 0 . 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
402 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 26) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 28) ) / / t i m e r > 25 and < 26 s e c
403 s e l f t e s t ( 0 . 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ; / / 2% o f t h r o t t l e
404 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 28) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 30) ) / / t i m e r > 26 and < 27 s e c
405 s e l f t e s t ( 0 . 2 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ; / / 4% o f t h r o t t l e
406 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 30) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 32) ) / / t i m e r > 27 and < 28 s e c
407 s e l f t e s t ( 0 . 2 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ; / / 6% o f t h r o t t l e
408 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 32) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 34) ) / / t i m e r > 28 and < 29 s e c
409 s e l f t e s t ( 0 . 3 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ; / / 8% o f t h r o t t l e
410 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 34) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 36) ) / / t i m e r > 29 and < 30 s e c
411 s e l f t e s t ( 0 . 3 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ; / / 10% o f t h r o t t l e
412 i f ( ( t i m e c h e c k > 37) && ( t i m e c h e c k < 38) )
413 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
414 i f ( t i m e c h e c k > 38) {
415 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
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416 re turn 0 ;
417 }




422 i n t a u t o p i l o t _ t e s t m o d e ( )
423 {
424 r o s : : Ra te l o o p _ r a t e ( 2 0 ) ;
425 i n t auto_commit =0;
426 whi le ( r o s : : ok ( ) ) {
427 / / I n au to s t a r t up r o u t i n e
428 i n t t i m e c h e c k ;
429 s t r u c t t i m e s p e c t e s t s , t e s t e ;
430 r o s : : sp inOnce ( ) ;
431 i f ( au to_commit == 0)
432 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &t e s t s ) ;
433 / / I n a u t o p i l o t s t a r t u p
434 auto_commit = 1 ;
435 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &t e s t e ) ;
436 t i m e c h e c k = t e s t e . t v _ s e c − t e s t s . t v _ s e c ;
437
438 i f ( ! ( a u t o _ t e s t ( t i m e c h e c k ) ) ) {
439 / / A u t p i l o t s t a r t u p i s c o m p l e t e d
440 PDEBUG( " end of s t a r t u p \ n " , 0 ) ;
441 re turn 1 ;
442 }
443 i f ( c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC == 0) {
444 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
445 auto_commit = 0 ;
446 re turn 1 ;
447 }






454 void r e a d _ p a r a m e t e r ( )
455 {
456
457 r o s : : NodeHandle nh ;
458
459 /∗ −−−−− a lpha and b e t a −−−− ∗ /
460 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / a l p h a " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>VTalphabetameas . a l p h a ) ;
461 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / b e t a " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>VTalphabetameas . b e t a ) ;
462
463 /∗ −−−−− e n a b l e −−−− ∗ /
464 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / e n a b l e " , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>E n a b l e D i s a b l e ) ;
465
466 /∗ −−−−− home command −−−− ∗ /
467 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / hmcmd" , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>HomeCmd) ;
468
469 /∗ −−−−− c o n t r o l l e r s e l e c t i o n −−−− ∗ /
470 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / c o n t r o l l e r _ s e l e c t i o n " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> C o n t r o l l e r s e l e c t i o n ) ;
471
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472 /∗ −−−−− gamma f l a g −−−− ∗ /
473 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / gamma_flag " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>gamma_flag ) ;
474
475 /∗ −−−−− LQR s e l e c t i o n −−−− ∗ /
476 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / L Q R s e l e c t i o n " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>L Q R s e l e c t i o n ) ;
477
478 /∗ −−−−− smoo th ing s w i t c h g u i d a n c e −−−− ∗ /
479 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / s m o o t h i n g _ s w i t c h i n g _ g u i d a n c e " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>S m o o t h i n g s w i t c h g u i d a n c e ) ;
480
481 /∗ −−−−− smoo th ing s w i t c h s e r v o −−−− ∗ /
482 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / s m o o t h i n g _ s w i t c h i n g _ s e r v o " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>S m o o t h i n g s w i t c h s e r v o ) ;
483
484 /∗ −−−−− t ime_window_servo −−−− ∗ /
485 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / t ime_window_servo " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>t ime_window_servo ) ;
486
487 /∗ −−−−− t ime_window_gu idance −−−− ∗ /
488 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / t ime_window_guidance " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>t ime_window_guidance ) ;
489
490 /∗ −−−−− KpLon ga in i n g u i d a n c e −−−− ∗ /




495 /∗ −−−−− KiLon ga in i n g u i d a n c e −−−− ∗ /
496 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / KiLon " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>KiLon ) ;
497
498
499 /∗ −−−−− L Lat −−−− ∗ /
500 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / L_Lat " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>L_Lat ) ;
501
502 /∗ −−−−− L Lon −−−− ∗ /
503 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / L_Lon " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>L_Lon ) ;
504
505 /∗ −−−−− KaLon ga in i n g u i d a n c e −−−− ∗ /
506 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / Ka_Lon " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Ka_Lon ) ;
507
508 /∗ −−−−− d2b ( d i s t a n c e t o b ) f o r g u i d a n c e −−−− ∗ /
509 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / d i s t 2 b " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> d i s t 2 b ) ;
510
511 /∗ −−−−− KpLat ga in f o r g u i d a n c e −−−− ∗ /
512 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / KpLat " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>KpLat ) ;
513
514 /∗ −−−−− SAS s w i t c h 0− o f f 1−on f o r o n l y a u t o p i l o t 2−on f o r RC −−−− ∗ /
515 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / SAS_switch " , h e l p e r s . SAS_flag ) ;
516 i f ( h e l p e r s . SAS_flag == 2)
517 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>SASswitch = 1 ;
518 e l s e
519 c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>SASswitch = h e l p e r s . SAS_flag ;
520
521 /∗ −−−−− SAS g a i n s −−−− ∗ /
522 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / k _ d t h e t a _ d e l e v a t o r " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>K_SAS_theta_de ) ;
523 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / k _ d Q _ d e l e v a t o r " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>K_SAS_q_de ) ;
524 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / k _ d P _ d a i l e r o n " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>K_SAS_P_da ) ;
525 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / k_dR_drudder " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>K_SAS_R_dr ) ;
526 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / K_phi_de " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>K_phi_de ) ;
527
60
528 /∗−−−−− c o r r e c t i o n s w i t c h −−−∗ /
529 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / c o r r e c t i o n _ s w i t c h " , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> c o r r e c t i o n _ s w i t c h ) ;
530
531 /∗−−−−− S a t u r a t i o n s w i t c h −−−∗ /
532 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / S a t u r a t i o n _ s w i t c h " , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> S a t u r a t i o n _ s w i t c h ) ;
533
534 /∗−−−−− p h i _ c m d _ s w i t c h −−−∗ /
535 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / ph i_cmd_swi tch " , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>ph i_cmd_swi tch ) ;
536
537 /∗−−−−− V c o r r e c t i o n _ s w i t c h −−−∗ /
538 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / V c o r r e c t i o n _ s w i t c h " , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>V c o r r e c t i o n _ s w i t c h ) ;
539
540 /∗−−−−− K_speed −−−∗ /
541 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / K_speed " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>K_speed ) ;
542
543 /∗−−−−− V s t a l l −−−∗ /
544 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / V s t a l l " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> V s t a l l ) ;
545
546 /∗−−−−− K_acc_guidance −−−∗ /
547 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / K_acc_gu idance " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>K_acc_guidance ) ;
548
549 /∗−−−−−Acc_feedback_on−−−∗ /
550 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / Acc_feedback_on " , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Acc_feedback_on ) ;
551
552 /∗−−−− t h r o t t l e t r im−−−∗ /
553 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / t h r o t t l e _ t r i m " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> t h r o t t l e t r i m ) ;
554
555 /∗−−−−e l e v a t o r t r im−−−∗ /
556 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / e l e v a t o r _ t r i m " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> e l e v a t o r t r i m ) ;
557
558 /∗−−−−a i l e r o n t r im−−−∗ /
559 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / a i l e r o n _ t r i m " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> a i l e r o n t r i m ) ;
560
561 /∗−−−−ru dd er t r im−−−∗ /
562 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / r u d d e r _ t r i m " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>r u d d e r t r i m ) ;
563
564 /∗−−−−mpf r a d i u s−−−∗ /
565 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / m p f _ r a d i u s " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>m p f r a d i u s ) ;
566
567 /∗−−−−mpf s w i t c h−−−∗ /
568 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / mpf_swi tch " , ( i n t &) c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>mpfswi tch ) ;
569
570 /∗−−−−pa th s e l e c t −−−∗ /
571 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / p a t h _ s e l e c t " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −> p a t h _ s e l e c t ) ;
572
573 /∗−−−−Q weigh t−−−∗ /
574 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / Q_weight " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>Q_weight ) ;
575
576 /∗−−−−max a l l o w e r r o r−−−∗ /
577 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / m a x _ a l l o w _ e r r o r " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>max_a l low_er r_d ) ;
578
579 /∗−−−−VT tr im−−−∗ /
580 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / VTtrim " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>VTtrim ) ;
581
582 /∗−−−−g u i d a n c e s e l e c t i o n −−−∗ /




586 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / d t " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>d t ) ;
587 # i f HIL_TEST
588 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / gps_vn " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_nor th ) ;
589 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / gps_ve " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_eas t ) ;
590 nh . ge tParam ( " / c o n t r o l l e r _ p a r a m / gps_vd " , c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSVeloci tymeas . V_down ) ;




595 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗a rgv [ ] )
596 {
597 long i t e r , r e p e a t = 0 ;
598 double i n t e r v a l _ s e c = ( double ) 1 / 2 0 ;
599 boo l auto_commit ; / / 0 − n o t i n i n i t i a l a u t o p i l o t
600 / / 1 − i n i n t i a l a u t o p i l o t
601 i n t s w i t c h _ c o u n t = 1 ; / / t o c o u n t number o f t i m e s p i c _ c i c i s t u r n e d on
602 s t r u c t t i m e s p e c s t a r t , end ;
603 r o s : : i n i t ( a rgc , argv , " c o n t r o l l e r _ D G 8 0 8 " ) ;
604 r o s : : NodeHandle n1 ;
605
606 r o s : : Time s t a r t _ r o s _ t i m e r , e n d _ r o s _ t i m e r ;
607
608 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r s u b _ h i l = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " /pwm" , 1000 , pwm_cal lback ) ;
609 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r s u b _ g p s _ i m u _ h i l =
610 n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / i n s " , 1000 , g p s _ c a l l b a c k ) ;
611 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r s u b _ w a y p o i n t s = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / way " , 1000 , w a y _ c a l l b a c k ) ;
612 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r sub_gps_pos = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / g p s _ p o s i t i o n " , 1000 , g p s _ p o s i t i o n _ c a l l b a c k ) ;
613 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r s u b _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / g p s _ v e l o c i t y " , 1000 , g p s _ v e l o c i t y _ c a l l b a c k ) ;
614 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r s u b _ i m u _ P Q R _ a c c e l e r a t i o n = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / i m u _ P Q R _ a c c e l e r a t i o n " , 1000 , i m u _ P Q R _ a c c e l e r a t i o n _ c a l l b a c k ) ;
615 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r s u b _ i m u _ a t t i t u d e = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / a t t i t u d e " , 1000 , i m u _ a t t i t u d e _ c a l l b a c k ) ;
616
617 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r sub_DAQ_pressure = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / p r e s s u r e " , 1000 , D A Q _ p re s s u r e _ c a l l ba c k ) ;
618
619 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r sub_DAQ_voltage = n1 . s u b s c r i b e ( " / b a t t e r y _ s t a t e " , 1000 , DAQ_vo l t age_ca l lback ) ;
620
621
622 g_pub_da t a_gs = n1 . a d v e r t i s e < d r o n e _ r o s : : d a t a > ( " d a t a " , 1000) ;
623 g _ p u b _ d a t a _ a r d u i n o = n1 . a d v e r t i s e < d r o n e _ r o s : : pwm > ( " s e r v o _ o p " , 1000) ;
624 g _ p u b _ d a t a _ h i l = n1 . a d v e r t i s e < d r o n e _ r o s : : h i l _ d a t a > ( " t o _ h i l " , 1000) ;
625
626 r o s : : Ra te l o o p _ r a t e ( 2 0 ) ;
627 s t a t i c i n t seq = 0 ;
628 seq ++;
629 r o s : : Time t imes t amp = r o s : : Time : : now ( ) ;
630
631 / / −−−−− To i n i t i a l i z e t h e mat lab g e n e r a t e d s t r u c t u r e s −−−−−//
632 DG808_GNC_mov_ini t ia l ize ( ) ;
633
634 / / −−−−− A s s i g n i n g ROS p a r a m e t e r s from la un ch f i l e −−−−−− / /
635 r e a d _ p a r a m e t e r ( ) ;
636
637 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &s t a r t ) ;
638 i t e r = 0 ;
639 s t a r t _ r o s _ t i m e r = r o s : : Time : : now ( ) ;
62
640 whi le ( r o s : : ok ( ) ) {
641 double r ema in_us ;
642 u i n t 6 4 _ t t m p d i f f ;
643 d r o n e _ r o s : : d a t a msg_data ;
644
645 r o s : : sp inOnce ( ) ;
646
647 # i f FLIGHT_TEST
648 /∗ i f ( ( c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPosi t ionmeas . L a t i t u d e != 0) &&
649 ( c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPosi t ionmeas . L o n g i t u d e != 0) &&
650 ( c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>GPSPosi t ionmeas . A l t i t u d e != 0) ) ∗ /
651 DG808_GNC_mov_step ( ) ;
652 PDEBUG( " In F l i g h t t e s t mode " , 0 ) ;
653 i f ( c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC == 1)
654 {
655 sw i t ch ( s w i t c h _ c o u n t ) {
656 case 1 : s w i t c h _ c o u n t = s w i t c h _ c o u n t + a u t o p i l o t _ t e s t m o d e ( ) ; / / i n i n i t i a l a u t o p i l o t check
don ’ t need t o send t h e pwm
657 PDEBUG( " \ n s w i t c h c o u n t i s %d " , s w i t c h _ c o u n t ) ;
658 whi le ( c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC ) {
659 r o s : : sp inOnce ( ) ;
660 s e l f t e s t ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
661 i f ( ! c o n t r o l l e r _ i n −>PICCIC )
662 c o n t i nu e ;
663 l o o p _ r a t e . s l e e p ( ) ;
664 }
665 break ;
666 d e f a u l t :




671 /∗ Outpu t t o t h e motor c o n t r o l l e r ∗ /
672 PDEBUG
673 ( " Out : t h r o t t l e =%f e l e v a t o r=%f a i l e r o n=%f r u d d e r=%f \ n \ n " ,
674 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . t h r o t t l e _ c m d ,
675 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . e l e va to r_ cm d ,
676 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . a i l e ron_cmd ,
677 c o n t r o l l e r _ o u t −>Cont ro lSurfaceCommands . rudder_cmd ) ;
678 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &end ) ;
679 i t e r ++;
680 t m p d i f f = g e t _ e l a p s e d (& s t a r t , &end ) ;
681 PDEBUG( " i t e r %l d took %" PRIu64 " us \ n " , i t e r , t m p d i f f / 1000) ;
682 s e t _ g r o u n d _ d a t a (& msg_data ) ;
683 e n d _ r o s _ t i m e r = r o s : : Time : : now ( ) ;
684 msg_data . d u r a t i o n = ( e n d _ r o s _ t i m e r − s t a r t _ r o s _ t i m e r ) . toNSec ( ) ∗ 1e−9;
685 g_pub_da t a_gs . p u b l i s h ( msg_data ) ;
686 p r i n t f ( " \ n \ n The t ime d i f f i s %f " , ( e n d _ r o s _ t i m e r − s t a r t _ r o s _ t i m e r ) . toNSec ( ) ∗ 1e−9) ;
687 / / t o run o n l y a t 20Hz
688 l o o p _ r a t e . s l e e p ( ) ;
689 # e n d i f
690 / / a s s i g n s e r v o commands and s e r v o d e f l e c t i o n v a l u e s
691 ass ign_se rvo_commands ( ) ;
692 a s s i g n _ s e r v o _ d f e f l e c t i o n s ( ) ;
693 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &s t a r t ) ;
694 }
63
695 DG808_GNC_mov_terminate ( ) ;
696 re turn 0 ;
697 }
D.2 Sensor Data Acquisition Code
This section lists the code to read all sensor data and output the servo commands to the motors.
D.2.1 RC, Air Velocity and Battery Voltage
This sub section contains the code to read RC, air velocity and battery voltage from our custom
built avionics board. This also contains code to send values to the actuator.
1 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗a rgv [ ] )
2 {
3 r o s : : i n i t ( a rgc , argv , " a r d u i n o " ) ;
4 r o s : : NodeHandle n ;
5
6 / / −−−−− A s s i g n i n g ROS p a r a m e t e r s from la un ch f i l e −−−−−− / /
7 r e a d _ p a r a m e t e r ( ) ;
8
9 # i f FLIGHT_TEST
10 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r pub_pwm ;
11 pub_pwm = n . a d v e r t i s e < d r o n e _ r o s : : pwm > ( "pwm" , 1000) ;
12
13 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r p u b _ t e m p e r a t u r e ;
14 p u b _ t e m p e r a t u r e = n . a d v e r t i s e < senso r_msgs : : Tempera tu r e > ( " t e m p e r a t u r e " , 1000) ;
15
16 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r p u b _ p r e s s u r e ;
17 p u b _ p r e s s u r e = n . a d v e r t i s e < senso r_msgs : : F l u i d P r e s s u r e > ( " p r e s s u r e " , 1000) ;
18
19 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r p u b _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e ;
20 p u b _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e = n . a d v e r t i s e < senso r_msgs : : B a t t e r y S t a t e > ( " b a t t e r y _ s t a t e " , 1000) ;
21 # e n d i f
22
23 r o s : : S u b s c r i b e r sub = n . s u b s c r i b e ( " / s e r v o _ o p " , 1000 , s e r v o r e c e p t i o n ) ;
24
25 r o s : : Ra te l o o p _ r a t e ( 2 0 ) ;
26
27 r o s : : Time t imes t amp = r o s : : Time : : now ( ) ;
28 i n t t t y _ f d = e s t a b l i s h _ s e r i a l ( ) ;
29 char buf [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
30
31 u s b s t a t u s . u s b _ a r d u i n o = 1 ;
32 whi le ( r o s : : ok ( ) ) {
33
34 r o s : : sp inOnce ( ) ;
35
36 # i f FLIGHT_TEST
64
37
38 d r o n e _ r o s : : pwm msg_pwm ;
39 senso r_msgs : : Tempera tu r e m s g _ t e m p e r a t r u r e ;
40 senso r_msgs : : F l u i d P r e s s u r e m s g _ p r e s s u r e ;
41 senso r_msgs : : B a t t e r y S t a t e m s g _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e ;
42
43 g e t r c ( t t y _ f d ) ; / / g e t s t h e rc i n p u t s
44 g e t p r e s s u r e ( t t y _ f d ) ; / / g e t s t h e p r e s s u r e i n p u t s
45 g e t t a c h ( t t y _ f d ) ; / / g e t s t h e t a c h
46 g e t c u r r e n t ( t t y _ f d ) ; / / g e t s t h e c u r r e n t
47
48
49 msg_pwm . h e a d e r . s tamp = t imes t amp ;
50
51 msg_pwm . PICCIC = h e l p e r s . a u t o _ s w i t c h ;
52 msg_pwm . T h r o t t l e = h e l p e r s . t h _ p e r c e n t ;
53 msg_pwm . E l e v a t o r = h e l p e r s . e l _ d e g ;
54 msg_pwm . A i l e r o n = h e l p e r s . a i _ d e g ;
55 msg_pwm . Rudder = h e l p e r s . ru_deg ;
56
57
58 m s g _ p r e s s u r e . f l u i d _ p r e s s u r e = h e l p e r s . p r e s s u r e ;
59
60 msg_pwm . v e l o c i t y = h e l p e r s . a i r _ v e l o c i t y ;
61
62 m s g _ t e m p e r a t r u r e . t e m p e r a t u r e = h e l p e r s . t e m p e r a t u r e ;
63
64 m s g _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e . v o l t a g e = h e l p e r s . v o l t a g e ;
65
66 msg_pwm . t a c h = h e l p e r s . rpm ;
67
68 m s g _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e . c u r r e n t = h e l p e r s . c u r r e n t [ 0 ] ;
69
70 msg_pwm . u s b s t a t u s = u s b s t a t u s . u s b _ a r d u i n o ;
71
72 pub_pwm . p u b l i s h ( msg_pwm ) ;
73 p u b _ t e m p e r a t u r e . p u b l i s h ( m s g _ t e m p e r a t r u r e ) ;
74 p u b _ p r e s s u r e . p u b l i s h ( m s g _ p r e s s u r e ) ;
75 p u b _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e . p u b l i s h ( m s g _ b a t t e r y _ s t a t e ) ;
76
77 # e n d i f
78
79 / / send o u t p u t
80 s p r i n t f ( buf , "%d %d %d %d \ n " , ( i n t ) t h r o t t l e , ( i n t ) e l e v a t o r ,
81 ( i n t ) a i l e r o n , ( i n t ) r u d d e r ) ;
82
83 s e n d o u t p u t ( t t y _ f d , buf ) ;
84




D.2.2 GPS and IMU
We have used Vector Nav VN 200 [8] for measuring position and attitude. The following code is
to read from VN200 sensor.
1 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗a rgv [ ] )
2 {
3 r o s : : i n i t ( a rgc , argv , " v e c t o r n a v " ) ;
4 r o s : : NodeHandle n ;
5
6
7 s t d : : s t r i n g p o r t ;
8 i n t baud ;
9 i n t c h e c k _ t i m e = 0 ;
10 char fname [ 1 2 8 ] ;
11 s t a t i c i n t seq = 0 ;
12 # i f FLIGHT_TEST
13
14 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r p u b _ i n s ;
15 p u b _ i n s = n . a d v e r t i s e < d r o n e _ r o s : : i n s > ( " i n s " , 1000) ;
16
17 / / add p u b l i s h e r h a n d l e r f o r sensor_msgs / NavSat t h a t c o n t a i n s GPS p o s i t i o n
18 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r p u b _ n a v _ s a t _ f i x ;
19 p u b _ n a v _ s a t _ f i x = n . a d v e r t i s e < senso r_msgs : : NavSatF ix > ( " g p s _ p o s i t i o n " , 1000) ;
20
21 / / add p u b l i s h e r h a n d l e r f o r geometry_msgs / T w i s t t h a t c o n t a i n s GPS v e l o c i t y
22 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r pub_Twis t_GPS_ve loc i t y ;
23 pub_Twis t_GPS_ve loc i t y = n . a d v e r t i s e < geometry_msgs : : Twis t > ( " g p s _ v e l o c i t y " , 1000) ;
24
25 / / add p u b l i s h e r h a n d l e r f o r sensor_msgs / Imu t h a t c o n t a i n s P , Q, R and l i n e a r a c c e l e r a t i o n
26 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r pub_Imu_PQR_Accelera t ion ;
27 pub_Imu_PQR_Accelera t ion = n . a d v e r t i s e < senso r_msgs : : Imu > ( " i m u _ P Q R _ a c c e l e r a t i o n " , 1000) ;
28
29 / / add p u b l i s h e r h a n d l e r f o r geometry_msgs / P o i n t t h a t c o n t a i n s Phi , The ta and P s i
30 r o s : : P u b l i s h e r p u b _ a t t i t u d e ;
31 p u b _ a t t i t u d e = n . a d v e r t i s e < geometry_msgs : : P o i n t > ( " a t t i t u d e " , 1000) ;
32
33
34 r o s : : Time t imes t amp = r o s : : Time : : now ( ) ;
35 n . param < s t d : : s t r i n g > ( " s e r i a l _ p o r t " , p o r t , " / dev / gps " ) ;
36 n . param < i n t >( " s e r i a l _ b a u d " , baud , 115200) ;
37 n . param < s t d : : s t r i n g > ( " imu / f r a m e _ i d " , imu_frame_id , "LLA" ) ;
38 r o s : : Ra te l o o p _ r a t e ( 2 0 ) ;
39
40 VN_ERROR_CODE v n _ r e t v a l ;
41
42 ROS_INFO ( " I n i t i a l i z i n g vn200 . P o r t :% s Baud:%d \ n " , p o r t . c _ s t r ( ) , baud ) ;
43
44 v n _ r e t v a l = vn200_connec t (&vn200 , p o r t . c _ s t r ( ) , baud ) ;
45 i f ( v n _ r e t v a l != VNERR_NO_ERROR) {
46 char vn_e r ro r_msg [ 1 0 0 ] ;
47 ROS_FATAL
48 ( " Could n o t c o n e n c t t o vn200 on p o r t :% s @ Baud:%d ; E r r o r %d \ n "
49 " Did you add your u s e r t o t h e ’ d i a l o u t ’ group i n / e t c / group ? " ,
66
50 p o r t . c _ s t r ( ) , baud , v n _ r e t v a l ) ;
51 e x i t ( EXIT_FAILURE ) ;
52 }
53
54 unsigned s h o r t s t a t u s ;
55 i n t check = 0 ;
56 VnVector3 ypr , l a t i t u d e L o g n i t u d e A l t i t u d e , V e l o c i t y , a c c e l , a n g u l a r R a t e ,
57 p o s i t i o n A c c u r a c y ;
58 double g p s t i m e ;
59 unsigned s h o r t week ;
60 unsigned char f i x , nos ;
61 f l o a t speed_acc , t i m e _ a c c ;
62 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &s t a r t ) ;
63 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &c a l c ) ;
64
65 whi le ( r o s : : ok ( ) ) {
66
67 double r ema in_us ;
68 u i n t 6 4 _ t t m p d i f f ;
69 / / c r e a t i n g message h a n d l e r f o r t o i c s
70 d r o n e _ r o s : : i n s msg_ins ;
71 senso r_msgs : : NavSatF ix m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n ;
72 geometry_msgs : : Twis t m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y ;
73 senso r_msgs : : Imu msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion ;
74 geometry_msgs : : P o i n t m s g _ a t t i t u d e ;
75
76 i f ( check <= 0)
77 v n 2 0 0 _ g e t G p s S o l u t i o n (&vn200 ,
78 &gps t ime ,
79 &week ,
80 &f i x ,
81 &nos ,
82 &l a t i t u d e L o g n i t u d e A l t i t u d e ,
83 &V e l o c i t y ,
84 &p o s i t i o n A c c u r a c y ,
85 &speed_acc , &t i m e _ a c c ) ;
86
87 i f ( ( g p s t i m e > 0) && ( week > 0) ) {
88 check ++;
89 p r i n t f ( " \ n \ n t h e t ime i s %l f " , g p s t i m e ) ;
90 }
91 v n _ r e t v a l = v n 2 0 0 _ g e t I n s S t a t e L l a (&vn200 ,
92 &ypr ,
93 &l a t i t u d e L o g n i t u d e A l t i t u d e ,
94 &V e l o c i t y , &a c c e l ,
95 &a n g u l a r R a t e ) ;
96 i f ( v n _ r e t v a l != VNERR_NO_ERROR) {
97 char vn_e r ro r_msg [ 1 0 0 ] ;
98 msg_ins . h e a d e r . seq = seq ;
99 msg_ins . h e a d e r . s tamp = t imes t amp ;
100 msg_ins . h e a d e r . f r a m e _ i d = imu_f rame_id ;
101 msg_ins . u s b s t a t u s = 0 ;
102 } e l s e {
103 msg_ins . h e a d e r . seq = seq ;
104 msg_ins . h e a d e r . s tamp = t imes t amp ;
105 msg_ins . h e a d e r . f r a m e _ i d = imu_f rame_id ;
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106 m s g _ a t t i t u d e . x = ypr . c2 ∗ 0 . 0 1 7 4 5 3 2 9 2 5 ; / / p h i / / I n t e n t i o n a l re−o r d e r i n g
107 m s g _ a t t i t u d e . y = ypr . c1 ∗ 0 . 0 1 7 4 5 3 2 9 2 5 ; / / t h e t a
108 m s g _ a t t i t u d e . z = ypr . c0 ∗ 0 . 0 1 7 4 5 3 2 9 2 5 ; / / p s i
109
110 msg_ins . t ime = g p s t i m e ;
111 msg_ins . week = week ;
112 / / msg_nos = nos ;
113
114 m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n . l a t i t u d e = l a t i t u d e L o g n i t u d e A l t i t u d e . c0 ;
115 m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n . l o n g i t u d e = l a t i t u d e L o g n i t u d e A l t i t u d e . c1 ;
116 m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n . a l t i t u d e = l a t i t u d e L o g n i t u d e A l t i t u d e . c2 ;
117
118 m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y . l i n e a r . x = V e l o c i t y . c0 ;
119 m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y . l i n e a r . y = V e l o c i t y . c1 ;
120 m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y . l i n e a r . z = V e l o c i t y . c2 ;
121
122 msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion . l i n e a r _ a c c e l e r a t i o n . x = a c c e l . c0 / GRAVITY;
123 msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion . l i n e a r _ a c c e l e r a t i o n . y = a c c e l . c1 / GRAVITY;
124 msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion . l i n e a r _ a c c e l e r a t i o n . z = a c c e l . c2 / GRAVITY;
125
126 msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion . a n g u l a r _ v e l o c i t y . x = a n g u l a r R a t e . c0 ;
127 msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion . a n g u l a r _ v e l o c i t y . y = a n g u l a r R a t e . c1 ;
128 msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion . a n g u l a r _ v e l o c i t y . z = a n g u l a r R a t e . c2 ;
129 msg_ins . u s b s t a t u s = 1 ;
130 }
131 / / P u b l i s h i n g t h e t o p i c s
132 p u b _ i n s . p u b l i s h ( msg_ins ) ;
133 p u b _ n a v _ s a t _ f i x . p u b l i s h ( m s g _ g p s _ p o s i t i o n ) ;
134 pub_Twis t_GPS_ve loc i t y . p u b l i s h ( m s g _ g p s _ v e l o c i t y ) ;
135 pub_Imu_PQR_Accelera t ion . p u b l i s h ( msg_imu_PQR_acce le ra t ion ) ;
136 p u b _ a t t i t u d e . p u b l i s h ( m s g _ a t t i t u d e ) ;
137
138 ROS_INFO ( " \ nData : \ n "
139 " YPR . Yaw : %f \ n "
140 " YPR . P i t c h : %f \ n "
141 " YPR . R o l l : %f \ n " ,
142 ypr . c2 , ypr . c1 , ypr . c0 ) ;
143 l o o p _ r a t e . s l e e p ( ) ;
144 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &end ) ;
145 t m p d i f f = g e t _ e l a p s e d (& s t a r t , &end ) ;
146 rema in_us = ( i n t e r v a l _ s e c ∗ 1000000 − t m p d i f f / 1000) ;
147 p r i n t f ( " \ n \ n took %l l u " , t m p d i f f / 1000) ;
148 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &s t a r t ) ;
149 c l o c k _ g e t t i m e (CLOCK_REALTIME, &c a l c 1 ) ;
150 double t ime_ms = g e t _ t i m e (& c a l c , &c a l c 1 ) ;
151
152 }
153 v n 2 0 0 _ d i s c o n n e c t (&vn200 ) ;
154 # e n d i f
155 re turn 0 ;
156 }
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